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CHAPTER 11 OF THE 1978
BANKRUPTCY CODE
ARTHUR L. MOLLERt
DAVID B. FOLTZ, JR.t
One of the most drastic, and unquestionably potentially the most
troublesome, provisions of the new Bankruptcy Code is the consolida-
tion of Chapters VIII, X, XI, and XII of the Bankruptcy Act of 1898
into a single business reorganization chapter, chapter 11 of the 1978
Code.' Consolidation, some writers say, has made possible a more ex-
peditious and more equitable business reorganization procedure.2 De-
spite such accolades, chapter 11 of the Code is not for the uninitiated
attorney or debtor. The consolidation has made the rehabilitation of
business debtors much more tedious and difficult, so that in all
probability and much like old Chapter X only strong businesses will be
able to survive the new reorganization process. This result is due to the
many concepts carried over into chapter 11 from old Chapter X, to the
greater leverage afforded secured creditors, to the protections and con-
trols afforded unsecured creditors and public holders of equity and
debt securities, and to the limited availability of the Code's only other
alternative to liquidation, chapter 13.1
There is much that is good in the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978,
to be sure-improvement that long has been needed. At the head of
the list is the improvement in the stature of the new bankruptcy court.4
t Counsel to Sheinfeld, Maley & Kay, Houston, Texas. Author, 6 COLLIER ON BANK-
RuPTcY (15th ed. 1979). Member, National Bankruptcy Conference. Bankruptcy Judge, South-
ern District of Texas, 1962-1975. B.A. & LL.B. 1937, University of Texas.
t Associate, Sheinfeld, Maley & Kay, Houston, Texas. Member Texas and Louisiana Bars.
B.A. 1975, Yale University; J.D. 1978, Tulane University.
1. 11 U.S.C.A. §§ 1101-1174 (West 1979). Act of Nov. 6, 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598,92 Stat.
2549 (codified at 11 U.S.C.A. §§ 101-152326 (West 1979), in scattered sections of 28 U.S.C.A.
(West Cum. Supp. 1979), and in scattered other titles, consists of four titles: Title I is the enact-
ment of the new Title 11 of the United States Code, which is herein referred to as the Bankruptcy
Code, or simply the Code; title II contains amendments to Title 28 of the United States Code and
to the Federal Rules of Evidence; title III contains amendments to other acts; title IV contains the
repeal of the Bankruptcy Act of 1898 and the transition provisions. Most provisions of the Act
became effective October 1, 1979.
2. King, Chapter 11 of the 1978 Bankruptcy Code, 53 AM. BANKR. L.J. 107 (1979); Trost,
Business Reorganizations Under Chapter 11 of the New Bankruptcy Code, 34 Bus. LAw. 1309
(1979).
3. 11 U.S.C.A. §§ 1301-1330 (West 1979).
4. See 28 U.S.C.A. §§ 151-160 (West Cure. Supp. 1979).
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Next in line for praise is the granting to the bankruptcy court of perva-
sive and exclusive civil jurisdiction over all matters related to the bank-
ruptcy case.5 This jurisdiction includes removal to the bankruptcy
court of cases that were pending in other courts at the time of the filing
of the petition in the bankruptcy court.6 Other reforms worthy of com-
ment are the slate of federal exemptions now available to the individ-
ual debtor,7 the realignment of the avoidance powers with commercial
practices now prevalent under the Uniform Commercial Code,8 and
the enhancement of chapter 13 relief to the individual debtor.9
These accomplishments may offer little solace, however, to the
small or middle-sized firm that is ineligible for chapter 13 relief and
thus is faced with the Hobson's choice of instituting a liquidation case
under chapter 7 or subjecting itself to the onerous and complex proce-
dures of chapter 11.
I. WHY CONSOLIDATION?
The idea of consolidating Chapters X, XI, and XII of the Bank-
ruptcy Act originated with the Commission on the Bankruptcy Laws of
the United States."0 Its report pointed out the inability of the Supreme
Court and the Commission to articulate clear and positive guidelines to
differentiate between debtors that should be reorganized in Chapter X
and those that might be reorganized in Chapter XI.t The Commission
was distressed that Chapter XI was being used by large companies with
total indebtedness of as much as eighty million dollars, and with
financial structures the Commission considered too complex for the rel-
5. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1471 (West Cum. Supp. 1979). As the result of a compromise between the
House and the Senate, exclusive jurisdiction of all cases under Title 11 is vested in the United
States district court. d. § 1471(a). In turn, the bankruptcy court is vested with all the jurisdiction
vested in the district court. Id. § 1471(c). In addition, the bankruptcy court is vested with exclu-
sive jurisdiction over all of the property of the debtor, wherever located, id. § 1471(e), a provision
that was included in the rehabilitation chapters of the Bankruptcy Act §§ 77a, 111, 311, 411, 611,
11 U.S.C. §§ 205(a), 511, 711, 811, 1011 (1976) (repealed 1978), but was not included in Chapters I
through VII, the "straight bankruptcy" provisions. The bankruptcy court may, in the interest of
justice, abstain from hearing a particular proceeding arising under Title 11 or arising in or related
to a case under Title 11, and its decision to abstain is not reviewable by appeal or otherwise. 28
U.S.C.A. § 1471(d) (West Cum. Supp. 1979).
6. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1478 (West Cum. Supp. 1979).
7. 11 U.S.C.A. § 522 (West 1979).
8. Id. §§ 544-554.
9. Id. § 1328(a).
10. S.J. Res. 88, 91st Cong., 2d Sess., Pub. L. No. 91-354, 84 Stat. 468 (1970).
11. REPORT OF THE COMM'N ON THE BANKRUPTCY LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES H.R.
Doc. No. 137, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. pt. 1, at 241-48 (1973).
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atively forthright and informal procedures of Chapter XI. 12
Convinced that these companies were resorting to Chapter XI be-
cause of its relative informality, and because trustees uniformly were
appointed in Chapter X to operate the business of the debtor and to
investigate management, the Commission concluded that Chapter XI
should be abolished. The report continued:
The only solution is an elimination of the disparate procedures.
The Commission therefore recommends a comprehensive business
reorganization chapter. The Commission's recommendations that
appointment of an independent trustee be discretionary, the absolute
priority rule be made more flexible, a finding be required that the
survival of the debtor is reasonably probable, and procedural re-
forms be made possible by the administrative agency' dispel the ar-
guments in favor of retaining Chapter XI. Even the desire [of the
debtor's management and its attorneys] to retain control is no longer
a compelling argument for Chapter XI, since the appointment of an
independent trustee is discretionary. 14
The Commission also felt that consolidation would eliminate
costly and unproductive litigation over the debtor's choice of chapters.
In particular, consolidation obviated the often futile, but always ex-
tremely disruptive and wasteful, motion under section 328 of the old
Act' s and Rule 11-1516 that was brought by the Securities and Ex-
change Commission [SEC], and occasionally by others, to convert the
Chapter XI case to one under Chapter X. In numerous cases such a
motion was not filed until the case had progressed to a point near reso-
lution of the debtor's problems. 17 Rule 11-15 attempted to halt the in-
ordinate delay that had become commonplace under section 328 by
requiring that the motion be filed within 120 days after the date of the
first meeting of creditors and stockholders. Unfortunately, much of the
12. Id. at 247.
13. The Commission recommended the creation of a United States Bankruptcy Administra-
tion with extensive powers in connection with liquidation and reorganization cases. Id. at 103-56.
The position of United States Trustee, which was created by the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978
for 18 pilot districts, is but a pale copy of the Commission's Bankruptcy Administration.
14. Id. at 248.
15. 11 U.S.C. § 728 (1976) (repealed 1978).
16. FED. BANKR. R. 11-15.
17. The classic example of late filing is SEC v. Canandaigua Enterprises Corp., 339 F.2d 14
(2d Cir. 1964), in which the filing was delayed until after a Chapter XI plan had been proposed
and accepted by quite substantial majorities. With the filing of the transfer motion, the court was
compelled to halt all progress in the case to hear the motion. At the conclusion of the hearing the
district court denied the SEC request for transfer to a Chapter X proceeding and the SEC
promptly appealed. With considerable reluctance the United States Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit reversed and sent the case back for the appointment of a trustee and conduct of the
case under Chapter X. Id. at 21. Adjudication followed.
19801
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ground that might have been gained was lost by giving the court au-
thority to extend the time for making the motion.18
The Commission believed that a consolidated chapter would net
immediate advantages over the old two-chapter approach. Abuses
caused by chapter shopping under the old Act would no longer be pos-
sible. Costly and wasteful litigation over the debtor's choice of chap-
ters also would be eliminated. Both of these features, it hoped, would
lead to a more expeditious, and therefore less expensive, procedure.
Of major concern to the Commission was the viability of a single
reorganization chapter--one with sufficient flexibility to accommodate
the rehabilitative needs of any business entity, whether the debtor be
small, medium, or large and whether doing business as an individual,
partnership, or corporation. The reformers contend that the new chap-
ter 11 does possess the needed flexibility. The consolidated chapter,
they say, seeks to perpetuate the expeditious contours of old Chapter
XI, while maintaining some of the public interest safeguards of Chap-
ter X.19
The Commission never gave a thought to consolidating the rail-
road reorganization provisions in Chapter VIII of the old Bankruptcy
Act 20 into the single business reorganization chapter of the new Act.
The drafters of the Code, however, have folded railroad reorganiza-
tions into the new chapter 1121 and, amazingly enough, have found it
necessary to exclude from railroad reorganization cases only a small
number of sections that apply to other business entities.22 If, with these
relatively minor adjustments, chapter 11 fits this kind of case, it is diffi-
cult to contend seriously that any substantial part of Chapter XI of the
Bankruptcy Act has been retained.
Only time can tell what has been wrought by the reformers in the
new chapter 11. The magnitude of the difficulties that have been cast
in the way of the debtor will depend to a major degree upon the strict-
ness of construction with which the courts approach the Code's new
provisions. The likelihood of adverse consequences for the debtor will
be pointed up in the ensuing discussion of the way the new chapter is
intended by the drafters to operate.
18. FED. BANKR. R. 11-15(b).
19. See Trost, supra note 2, at 1310-11.
20. 11 U.S.C. § 205 (1976) (repealed 1978). Chapter VIII of the Bankruptcy Act consisted of
only one section, § 77, which related to railroad reorganization.
21. 11 U.S.C.A. §§ 1161-1174 (West 1979).
22. See id. § 1161.
[Vol. 58
19801 CHAPTER 11
II. COMMENCEMENT OF A CASE UNDER CHAPTER 11
No chapter of the new Bankruptcy Code is complete in and of
itself. The Code is as much a ten-finger exercise as is the Uniform
Commercial Code. Chapters 1, 3, and 5 of the Code are applicable to a
chapter 11 case.23 The definitions for chapter I 1 cases are found partly
in chapter 124 and partly in chapter 11.25 Rules of construction 26 and
specification of entities that may be debtors under chapter 1127 are
found in chapter 1. Administrative powers, including the automatic
stay,28 use of collateral,29 the borrowing of money,30 rejection of execu-
tory contracts, 3 ' and provisions regarding continuation of utility serv-
ices32 are contained in chapter 3. The turnover of property to the
estate,33 the avoiding powers of a trustee or debtor,34 and setoff" are
found in chapter 5. In eighteen judicial districts3 6 there will be a
United States trustee, who is given important powers and duties in
chapter 11 cases by chapter 15 of the Code,37 and by provisions added
to Title 28 of the United States Code. 8
Chapter 11 is available to all businesses, whether operated by indi-
viduals, partnerships, or corporations. The case may be commenced by
the filing of a voluntary petition by the debtor,3 9 a joint petition by
debtor and spouse,4° or an involuntary petition filed by creditors.4 '
The requirements for an involuntary chapter 11 petition are the same
as for a liquidation case under chapter 7. Three petitioning creditors,42
23. 11 U.S.C.A. § 103(a) (West 1979).
24. Id. § 101.
25. Id. § 1101.
26. Id. § 102.
27. Id. § 109(d).
28. Id. § 362.
29. Id. § 363.
30. Id. § 364.
31. Id. § 365.
32. Id. § 366.
33. Id. §§ 542, 543.
34. Id. §§ 544-549.
35. Id. § 553.
36. Id. § 1501. These districts are referred to hereafter as "pilot districts."
37. Id. §§ 151102-151105.
38. 28 U.S.C.A. §§ 581-589 (West Cum. Supp. 1979), especially § 586(a)(3).
39. 11 U.S.C.A. § 301 (West 1979).
40. Id. § 302.
41. Id. § 303(a). A petition filed by less than all of the general partners of a partnership is
treated as an involuntary petition. See id. § 303(b)(3).
42. Id. § 303(b)(1).
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
or a single creditor if there are less than twelve,43 holding claims that
aggregate at least five thousand dollars more than the value of any lien
on property of the debtor may file the involuntary petition. The peti-
tion need allege no more than that the debtor is not paying his debts as
they become due, or that within 120 days before the filing of the peti-
tion a custodian'4 was appointed or authorized to take possession of
substantially all of the property of the debtor.4 Upon the filing of an
involuntary petition, the court may, on request of a party in interest,
appoint a trustee to operate the business.46 If a trustee is not appointed,
the debtor may continue to operate the business and "to use, acquire or
dispose of' property as if the case had not be commenced.47 If the
debtor contests the involuntary petition, a jury trial on the issues is a
matter within the discretion of the court.48 The idea of an involuntary
petition is a radical departure from Chapter XI of the Bankruptcy Act
and is clearly derived instead from old Chapter X.49 If the involuntary
petition is not timely controverted,50 the court is required to enter an
order for relief under Chapter 11 against the debtor.5'
The apparent ease of sustaining an involuntary petition, which has
resulted from the abolition of acts of bankruptcy and removal of the
need to allege and prove insolvency of the debtor, has made it neces-
sary to build into the Code certain protective devices. If the court
should dismiss the involuntary petition other than on the consent of all
petitioners and the debtor, and if the debtor does nbt waive the right to
judgment, the court may grant judgment in favor of the debtor against
the petitioners for costs, a reasonable attorney's fee, and any damages
proximately caused by the taking of possession of the debtor's property
by a trustee appointed by the court.52 Even though no trustee was ap-
pointed, a bad faith petitioner may be liable for both compensatory
43. Id. § 303(b)(2).
.44. "Custodian" is defined in id. § 101(10).
45. Id. § 303(h).
46. Id. § 1104(a).
47. Id. § 303(f).
48. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1480(b) (West Cum. Supp. 1979). Jury trial of the issues created by an
answer filed in a case under Chapter X of the Bankruptcy Act was not permitted. See II U.S.C.
§§ 543, 544 (1976) (repealed 1978).
49. 11 U.S.C. § 526 (1976) (repealed 1978).
50. It is, probable that FED. BANKR. R. 10-1 12(a)(l) will govern the time to file an answer to
an involuntary Chapter 11 petition until new rules are promulgated.
51. 11 U.S.C.A. § 303(h) (West 1979).
52. Id. § 303(i)(1). Subsection (i) states these various elements of damage disjunctively. The
term "or" is not exclusive. See Id. § 102(5). The court may therefore grant any or all of the
damages provided for under this provision.
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and punitive damages. 3
III. THE AUTOMATIC STAY
A. Actions Subject to the Stay
The filing of a petition under any chapter of the Code operates
automatically as a stay, applicable to all entities, 4 of the commence-
ment or continuation of a judicial, administrative, or other proceeding
against the debtor that was or could have been commenced before the
filing of the petition under Title 11, or to recover a claim against the
debtor that arose before the commencement of the case;5  the enforce-
ment against the debtor or against property of the estate56 of a judg-
ment obtained before the commencement of the case; 57 any act to
obtain possession of property of the estate or property from the estate;
58
any act to create, perfect, or enforce any lien against property of the
estate;5 9 any act to create, perfect, or enforce against property of the
estate any lien to the extent that such lien secures a claim that arose
before the commencement of the case;60 any act to collect, assess, or
recover a claim against the debtor that arose before the commencement
of the case;61 the setoff of any debt owing to the debtor that arose
before the commencement of the case;62 and the commencement of
continuation of a proceeding before the United States Tax Court con-
cerning the debtor.63
Certain types of actions are excepted specifically from the opera-
tion of the automatic stay. These exceptions have been spelled out in
the Code largely to set to rest some of the uncertainties that have arisen
under the Bankruptcy Rules. The filing of a petition does not stay the
commencement of criminal proceedings against the debtor;' 4 the col-
53. Id. § 303(i)(2).
54. "Entity" includes a person, estate, trust, and governmental unit. Id. § 101(14). "Person"
includes an individual, partnership, and corporation, but does not include a governmental unit.
Id. § 101(30).
55. Id. § 362(a)(1).
56. Property of the estate is defined in id. § 541.
57. Id. § 362(a)(2).
58. Id. § 362(a)(3).
59. Id. § 362(a)(4).
60. Id. § 362(a)(5).
61. Id. § 362(a)(6).
62. Id. § 362(a)(7). Even though the right of setoff of mutual debts and credits is stayed, the
right of setoff is not nullified. See id. § 553.
63. Id. § 362(a)(8).
64. Id. § 362(b)(1).
1980]
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lection of alimony, maintenance or support from property that is not
property of the estate;65 any act to perfect an interest in property to the
extent that the trustee's rights and powers are subject to such perfection
under section 546(b);66 the commencement or continuation of a pro-
ceeding by a governmental unit to enforce its police or regulatory
power;67 the enforcement of a judgment, other than a money judgment,
obtained in an action by a governmental unit to enforce its police or
regulatory power;6 8 the setoff of mutual debts and credits involving
commodities or securities; 69 the commencement of actions by the Sec-
retary of Housing and Urban Development to foreclose a mortgage or
deed of trust, held by the Secretary, on property consisting of five or
more living units, which is or was formerly insured under the National
Housing Act;70 or the issuance to the debtor by a governmental unit of
a notice of tax deficiency.7 1
B. Duration of the Stay
Except as it may be modified, the stay of an act against property of
the estate continues until such property is no longer property of the
estate.72 The stay of any other act continues until the occurrence of any
one of the following: the closing of the case; the dismissal of the case;
or, if the case concerns an individual and is under Chapter 7 or is a case
under Chapter 9, 11, or 13, the time when a discharge is granted or
denied.73
C. Relieffrom the Stay
In order to obtain relief from the stay, a party in interest must
request such relief from the court.74 The provisions in the Bankruptcy
Rules for ex parte relief from the stay in order to prevent irreparable
65. Id. § 362(b)(2).
66. Id. § 362(b)(3). This will permit the perfection of prepetition purchase money security
interests and mechanics' liens. H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 371-72 (1977), reprintedin
[1978] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 5963, 6327-28 [hereinafter cited as HOUSE REPORT]. The
retroactive effect of perfection is recognized by 11 U.S.C.A. 546(b) (West 1979).
67. 11 U.S.C.A. § 362(b)(4) (West 1979).
68. Id. § 362(b)(5).
69. Id. § 362(b)(6). This provision has no relevance in Chapter 11 cases because stockbro-
kers and commodity brokers may not be debtors under Chapter 11. See id. § 109(d).
70. Id. § 362(b)(7). It should be noted that although commencement of such a suit is not
stayed, prosecution of that suit is stayed. See Id. § 362(a)(1).
71. .d. § 362(b)(8).
72. Id. § 362(c)(1).
73. Id. § 362(c)(2).
74. Id. § 362(d).
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injury have been carried forward into the Code.75 In the more general
case, after notice and a hearing,7 6 the stay shall be terminated, an-
nulled, modified, or conditioned for cause, including lack of adequate
protection of an interest of a secured creditor.77 The stay also may be
modified if the debtor does not have any equity in the property that
secures the claim and such property is not necessary to an effective re-
organization of the debtor.78 The party requesting relief from the stay
has the burden of proof on the issue of the debtor's equity in the prop-
erty;79 the trustee or debtor has the burden of proof on all other is-
sues.
8 0
The Committee on the Judiciary of the House of Representatives
expressed some uneasiness over the delay of the courts in resolving re-
quests for relief from the automatic stay,8 I despite the mandate of the
Bankruptcy Rules, 82 and decided to bring about a change. The method
chosen will have a tremendous impact on, and may well put an end to,
the near-current condition of the bankruptcy court dockets across the
country. If the court does not hold a preliminary or final hearing on
the request for relief from the stay of an act against property of the
estate within thirty days after it is filed, the stay is terminated with re-
spect to the party making the request.8 3 If the hearing that is held
within the thirty-day period is only a preliminary hearing, the court
shall order the stay continued if there is a reasonable likelihood that
the party opposing relief from the stay will prevail at the final hearing,
and the final hearing shall be commenced within thirty days after that
preliminary hearing.8 4 No time is specified in the Code within which
the final hearing must be concluded, nor, having been concluded,
within which the court must announce a ruling. However, the Sug-
75. 11 U.S.C.A. § 362(f) (West 1979).
76. See id. § 102(1).
77. Id. § 362(d)(1)..
78. Id. § 362(d)(2).
79. Id. § 362(g)(1).
80. Id. § 362(g)(2).
81. "Too often today, court delay in handling requests for relief amounts to a complete de-
nial of relief. The court can thus avoid the issue, and yet rule in the debtor's favor. This bill
prevents such action." HousE RPOPORT, supra note 66, at 595, 175.
82. FED. BANKR. R. 601(c), 8-501(c), 10-601(c), 11-44(d), 12-43(d), 13-401(d): "[Tlhe...
court shall. . . set the trial for the earliest possible date, and it shall take precedence over all
matters except older matters of the same character."
83. 11 U.S.C.A. § 362(e) (West 1979). The inappropriateness of this provision, which de-
prives the court of any discretion, irrespective of competing exigencies, is pointed out in Kennedy,
Automatic Stays Under The New Bankruptcy Law, 12 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 3, 41 n.169 (1978).
84. 11 U.S.C.A. § 362(e)(2) (West 1979).
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gested Interim Bankruptcy Rules, 5 which have been adopted as local
rules by the bankruptcy courts in a number of districts, professed to
find "a procedural void left by section 362 of the Code" and provided
for expiration of the stay thirty days after a final hearing is commenced,
unless within that time the court determines that the stay should be
continued.86
Other remedies than the automatic stay are available to the bank-
ruptcy court to restrain interference with its cases. For example, the
essence of section 2(a)(15) of the Bankruptcy Act87 has been carried
into the Code.88 In addition, the bankruptcy court is invested with the
powers of a court of equity, law, and admiralty,89 and, having at long
last been designated officially as a "court of the United States,"9 the
bankruptcy court has power to issue writs under the All Writs Statute.9'
Through these devices, without regard for competing demands on
the court's time or the debtor's attention, the court is deprived of any
discretion regarding the stay, and lien creditors are handed a ready-
made vehicle for hindering the progress of a reorganization, or even
bringing the reorganization to a complete halt by the filing of a succes-
sion of requests for relief. If these requests for modification of the stay
come early in the case, and in sufficient numbers, the debtor will be
devoting all his attention and energies to resisting them; the diversion
of his attention at this critical stage of the case may very well spell
doom for the hoped-for rehabilitation.
The proper procedure for seeking relief from the stay of section
362 remains in doubt pending promulgation of new rules, which is sev-
eral years away. If Bankruptcy Rule 701 remains in effect insofar as
concerns the pleading that must be filed by a party seeking relief from
85. ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON BANKRUPTCY OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE
UNITED STATES, SUGGESTED INTERIM BANKRUPTCY RULES (1979) [hereinafter cited SUGGESTED
INTERIM RULES]. The recently reconstituted Advisory Committee on Bankruptcy Rules of the
Judicial Conference of the United States prepared these interim rules in some haste, transmitted
them to bankruptcy and district courts across the nation, and suggested that, for the sake of uni-
formity, they be adopted as local rules in the various districts. These Interim Rules are unofficla
and have no effect except in the districts that have adopted them. That no district is known to
have adopted the rules without having made material changes in both the rules and the accompa-
nying forms before their adoption is indicative of the haste in preparation, and perhaps the unde-
sirability or inadequacy of some of these rules. Thus, the Advisory Committe's hoped-for
uniformity has failed.
86. See SUGGESTED INTERM RULE 4001(a).
87. 11 U.S.C. § 11(a)(15) (1976) (repealed 1978).
88. 11 U.S.C.A. § 105(a) (West 1979).
89. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1481 (West Cum. Supp. 1979).
90. Id. §451.
91. Id. § 1651.
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the stay, that party will be required to file a complaint seeking such
relief.92 The court will be required to set the matter for trial at the
earliest possible date and to give it precedence over all matters except
older matters of the same character.93 For cause shown the court will
be authorized to terminate, annul, modify, or condition the stay.94 The
party seeking continuation of the stay against lien enforcement will be
required to show that he is entitled such a continuation.95
Two major problems come into focus immediately in the context
of requests for relief from the automatic stay of section 362 vis-a-vis the
existing Bankruptcy Rules. Bankruptcy Rule 712 controls the time for
filing answers to complaints.96 Unless a different time is prescribed by
the court, a defendant is not required to file and serve his answer until
thirty days after issuance by the clerk of the summons provided for by
Rule 704. This rule simply does not accommodate the time require-
ments of section 362.
The second major problem relates to the provisions for affirmative
defenses and counterclaims under Bankruptcy Rules 712(b) and 713.97
Bankruptcy Rule 713 generally adopts Rule 13 of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure, with certain exceptions not pertinent to the present
discussion. Rule 13 requires the defendant to assert in his answer
"compulsory counterclaims," which are defined roughly as any claims
that the defendant has against the plaintiff that arise out of the same
transaction or occurrence that is the subject matter of the plaintiffs
claim.98 Since Rule 13 is otherwise generally applicable in adversary
proceedings, the trustee or debtor would appear to be subject to the
compulsory counterclaim rule when a secured creditor seeks relief from
an automatic stay. Certainly this result is consistent with that reached
by the federal courts in nonbankruptcy cases prior to the promulgation
of the Bankruptcy Rules. If, then, the trustee or debtor does file a
counterclaim, has the party seeking relief from the stay submitted to
the jurisdiction of the court to determine the counterclaim? This was a
major pre-Code issue when the bankruptcy court had only limited or
"summary" jurisdiction. Neither the stay rules nor the rules control-
ling counterclaims could extend the scope of the summary jurisdiction
92. See FED. BANKR. R. 701(6), 703.
93. See FED. BANKR. R. 601(c), 8-501(c), 10-601(c), 11-44(d), 12-43(d), 13-401(d).
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. FED. BANKR. R. 712.
97. FEDy BANKR. R. 712(b), 713.
98. FED. R. Civ. P. 13(a).
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of the bankruptcy court to determine the controversy raised by a coun-
terclaim, but conventional principles of federal jurisdiction dictate that
the court would have jurisdiction unless the counterclaim was permis-
sive and not compulsory.99
The reported cases considering counterclaims in response to com-
plaints for modification of the stay of the Bankruptcy Rules mainly
have involved real property in rehabilitation cases. The aversion of the
courts to considering these types of responses in the context of com-
plaints to modify the stay has culminated in In re Essex Properties,
Ltd ,1o and In re Roloff.'°' Feeling that there might be something un-
fair about requiring a party to come into the bankruptcy court in order
to get relief from an automatic stay prescribed by a Rule of Bankruptcy
Procedure and then subjecting him to the necessity of defending a
counterclaim in a forum that was not of his choosing, these courts
seized upon the notion that the complaint for modification of the stay is
in essence defensive in nature and does not assert a "claim" at all; that
the real subject matter of the complaint is the claim for relief from the
stay rather than the underlying claim for money; since the claim for
relief from the stay is the substance of the complaint, the validity and
amount of the underlying claim for money is not one arising out of the
same transaction and, therefore, the counterclaim is improperly filed
and cannot be entertained by the bankruptcy court. These courts sim-
ply did not feel that the proceeding for the modification of the stay
should be slowed down by such counterclaims.
Some of the arguments against slowing down the relief from stay
procedure through the counterclaim and affirmative defense mecha-
nisms advanced in the pre-Code cases have some surface appeal. They
do not, however, afford satisfactory means for determining well-
founded counterclaims.
The congressional reports, one before and one after Essex, both
before Roloff',muddled through the problem without seeing it for what
it really was or resolving it to anyone's satisfaction. The House report
commented:
At the expedited hearing under subsection (e), and at all hear-
ings on relief from the stay, the only issue will be the claim of the
creditor and the lack of adequate protection or existence of other
cause for relief from the stay. This hearing will not be the appropri-
99. 6 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, CIVIL § 1414 (1971).
100. Krause v. Essex Properties, Ltd. (In re Essex Properties, Ltd.), 430 F. Supp. 1112 (N.D.
Cal. 1977).
101. Roloffv. Audobon Savings & Loan Assn. (In re Rolofi), 598 F.2d 783 (3d Cir. 1979).
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ate time at which to bring in other issues, such as counterclaims
against the creditor on largely unrelated matters. Those counter-
claims are not to be handled in the summary fashion that the prelim-
inary hearing under this provision will be. Rather, they will be the
subject of more complete proceedings by the trustee to recover prop-
erty of the estate or to object to the allowance of a claim.10 2
The Senate report seemed to make a bit of a concession, but still did
not recognize or solve the real dilemma:
The action commenced by the party seeking relief from the stay
is referred to as a motion to make it clear that at the expedited hear-
ing under subsection (e), and at hearings on relief from the stay, the
only issue will be the lack of adequate protection, the debtor's equity
in the property, and the necessity of the property to an effective reor-
ganization of the debtor, or the existence of other cause for relief
from the stay. This hearing will not be the appropriate time at which
to bring in other issues, such as counterclaims against the creditor,
which, although relevant to the question of the amount of the debt,
concern largely collateral or unrelated matters. This approach is
consistent with that taken in cases such as. . .In re Essex Properties,
Ltd,. . . that an action seeking relief from the stay is not the asser-
tion of a claim which would give rise to the right or obligation to
assert counterclaims. Those counterclaims are not to be handled in
the summary fashion that the preliminary hearing under this provi-
sion will be. Rather, they will be the subject of more complete pro-
ceedings by the trustee to recover property of the estate or to object
to the allowance of a claim. However, this would not preclude the
party seeking continuance of the stay from presenting evidence of the
existence of claims which the court may consider in exercising its
discretion. What is precluded is a determination of such collateral
claims on the merits at the hearing.' 0 3
The considerations posed in these reports are meaningful insofar
as they emphasize adequate protection as required by section 361 of the
Code. However, they overlook very basic issues:. (1) The summary-
plenary jurisdiction dichotomy of the bankruptcy court no longer exists
because of the pervasive jurisdiction granted to that court by the
amendments to Title 28 of the United States Code effected by the
Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978.1° There is, therefore, no longer any
substance to the pre-Code fears that the rules might be used to expand
the court's jurisdiction. Under the 1978 Act, foreclosure suits that may
be pending at the time of a filing under Title 11 may be removed to the
102. HOUSE REPORT, supra note 66, at 344.
103. S. REP. No. 989, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 55, reprinted in [1978] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWS 5787, 5841 [hereinafter cited as SENATE REPORT].
104. See text accompanying notes 4-6 supra.
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bankruptcy court."0 5 (2) Some counterclaims and affirmative defenses
are genuine, and are not "the product of zeal in attempting merely to
create issues of fact," as they were characterized by one court,'0 6 or
lacking in good faith, as they were characterized by the same court in
an earlier case. 10 7 (3) Essex, Roloff, and the cases preceding them in-
volved real property in jurisdictions in which judicial foreclosure of
real property liens was required and a suit seeking such relief was
pending in a state court when the case under the Bankruptcy Act was
filed. Now such suits would be removed to the bankruptcy court.'10 (4)
In a number of jurisdictions the creditor secured by real estate collat-
eral need not put the validity and amount of his claim on the line in a
judicial foreclosure action but may have his trustee under a deed of
trust divest the debtor of his title by a courthouse-steps foreclosure
sale. 1 9 In addition, a foreclosure of a security interest under Article 9
of the Uniform Commercial Code may be had without court action of
any kind. In jurisdictions and instances such as these the only forum
realistically available to the debtor for a challenge of the validity of the
creditor's claim or its amount is the bankruptcy court. If that court
refuses to hear him, he is effectively denied any forum.
Prior to enactment of the Code, in any contdxt other than in re-
sponse to a complaint for modification of the stay, there was no ques-
tion that a counterclaim or an atirmative defense very properly could
be used in the bankruptcy court to reduce or even to defeat a claim
asserted, whether or not the bankruptcy court had jurisdiction to enter
an affirmative judgment against the adverse party in the event that the
amount found to be owing on the counterclaim should exceed the
amount due to the adverse party on his claim."10 This points up in bold
perspective a basic weakness in Essex and similar pre-Code cases, as
well as in the House and Senate reports quoted above. If there is some
compelling public policy that requires such haste to accommodate the
secured creditor at the expense of an already financially troubled
debtor, it has never been articulated. When an Essex-type case arose in
a jurisdiction in which a judicial foreclosure was required, the debtor at
105. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1478 (West Cum. Supp. 1979).
106. First Natl Bank v. Overmyer Co. (In re Overmyer Co.), 2 Bankr. Ct. Dec. 992, 994
(S.D.N.Y. 1976).
107. C.I. Mortgage Group v. Groundhog Mtn. Corp. (In re Groundhog Mtn. Corp.), I Bankr.
Ct. Dec. 923, 925 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
108. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1478 (West Cum. Supp. 1979).
109. G. OSBORNE, G. NELSON, D. WHImAN, REL ESTATE FINANCE LAW 475 n.91 (1979).
110. See Bankruptcy Act § 68, 11 U.S.C. § 108 (1976) (repealed 1978); 4 COLLIER ON BANK-
RUPTCY $ 68.20[4] (14th ed. 1978).
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least had a forum in which to assert his counterclaims and affirmative
defenses. In jurisdictions in which a more summary form of real estate
foreclosure was condoned, and in foreclosures of personal property
under Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code, denial by the bank-
ruptcy court of the right to be heard on counterclaims and factual de-
fenses effectively denied the debtor any defense. To carry forward the
flawed reasoning of these pre-Code cases can produce totally inequita-
ble, even shocking results.
The expanded jurisdiction now possessed by the bankruptcy court
eliminates many of the old problems. Accepting for the moment that
the section 362 hearing should be held with dispatch, the debtor must
be afforded the right to present his counterclaims and defenses against
the claim of the secured party, regardless of what they may consist. On
the other side of the coin, the secured creditor is entitled to adequate
protection of its interest. The House and Senate reports properly em-
phasize that the primary issue at the section 362 hearing is that of ade-
quate protection. But adequate protection of what interest? And of how
much of an interest? The reports are entirely unconvincing when they
postulate that counterclaims and affirmative defenses have no place in
the stay hearings. In determining the extent of protection that in justice
and fairness should be afforded the secured creditor, the court cannot
ignore the existence and possible merit of counterclaims that may re-
duce materially or even defeat the claim asserted by the moving party.
Even the Roloff court admitted as much in a footnote:
[T]o the extent that the bankruptcy judge believes that Audubon's
lien will be invalidated or reduced in a different forum it may affect
his judgment on the Roloffs' equity in the property.... Thus, al-
though the Roloffs cannot attack the judgment by counterclaiming
before the bankruptcy judge, they may plead facts that are relevant
to the equities of continuing the stay, and one such fact would be any
flaw in Audubon's claim. 1'
The request for relief from the stay is nothing more than the pur-
suit of lien enforcement. The bankruptcy court now has complete juris-
diction to determine all issues between the parties. As long as adequate
protection is afforded to the secured creditor in an amount determined
after consideration of factors such as the ones suggested in the Roloff
footnote, the stay litigation should turn into a trial on the merits of the
entire controversy. Denial of this right to the debtor can be justified no
longer.
111. 598 F.2d at 789 n.23.
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IV. OPERATION OF THE DEBTOR'S BUSINESS
Under the new Code, no court order is required for the debtor to
continue operation of his business, and unless the court orders other-
wise the debtor will continue to do so."1 2 The court is removed from
any obligation to oversee or otherwise be concerned about the opera-
tion of that business. The court is in the case to resolve disputes impar-
tially, and until a pleading is filed creating an issue, the court may not
inject itself into the case. 1 3 However, until the parties in interest be-
come accustomed to the bankruptcy judge's no longer being the official
watchdog and no longer being permitted sua sponte to curb the debtor's
methods of operating the business or order its closing, and until they
learn to take the necessary action to bring these matters to issue before
the court, it is very likely that assets will be dissipated. In pilot districts
the supervision of the debtor in chapter 11 is one of the duties of the
United States trustee.I" In other districts the creditors' committee will
have to assume the entire responsibility. On motion the court is em-
powered to impose limitations or conditions on the debtor's opera-
tions.115
In the operation of the business, the debtor in possession or the
trustee will have full use of the administrative powers provided in sub-
chapter IV of chapter 3,116 and of the powers in connection with the
estate contained in subchapter III of chapter 5.1' Some of these pow-
ers, however, sound better on a cursory reading than they may prove to
be in actual operation.
A. Use of Collateral
"Cash collateral" is defined to mean cash, negotiable instruments,
documents of title, securities, deposit accounts, or other cash
equivalents in which the estate and another entity have an interest.' 18
112. The Code provides that, unless the court orders otherwise, the trustee may operate the
debtor's business. 11 U.S.C.A. § 1108 (West 1979). It in turn confers on the debtor in possession,
with exceptions not here pertinent, all the rights and powers of a trustee serving in a case under
Chapter 11. Id. § 1107.
113. Although until rules like FED. BANKR. R. 10-212, 11-25, 12-24, and 13-204 are replaced
by new rules, the court must fix dates for creditors' meetings, and may order a meeting of equity
security holders, see I 1 U.S.C.A. § 341(b) (West 1979), the court may not preside at, and may not
attend, any such meetings. See id. § 34 1(c).
114. 28 U.S.C.A. § 586(a)(3) (West Cum. Supp. 1979).
115. 11 U.S.C.A. § 1107(a) (West 1979).
116. Id. §§ 361-366.
117. Id. § 541-554.
118. Id. § 363(a).
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In addition, if noncash collateral is converted into proceeds of the type
defined as cash collateral, the proceeds must be treated as cash collat-
eral as long as "proceeds" are subject to the prepetition security inter-
est.' '9 Thus, if the debtor sells for cash inventory that is subject to a
prepetition security interest, or collects accounts receivable that are
subject to a prepetition security interest, these proceeds become cash
collateral, and they must be segregated and accounted for.' 20
The debtor may not use, sell, or lease cash collateral, in the ordi-
nary course of business or otherwise, unless each entity that has an in-
terest in the cash collateral consents, or the court, after notice and a
hearing, authorizes such use, sale, or lease.12 1 Noncash collateral that
is property of the estate may be used, sold, or leased in the ordinary
course of business without notice or a hearing.' 22 In order for noncash
collateral to be used otherwise than in the ordinary course of business
the court, after notice and a hearing, must authorize it.12 3
"After notice and a hearing" is a term to which a rule of construc-
tion applies.' 24 It means after notice that is appropriate in the particu-
lar circumstances, and after appropriate opportunity for a hearing. An
actual hearing is not required if notice is given properly and if such a
hearing is not timely requested by a party in interest, or if there is in-
sufficient time for a hearing to be commenced before an act must be
done and the court authorizes the act.' 2 5 The matter of "appropriate
notice" is left to rules that have not yet been promulgated. Until they
are, it must be assumed that the debtor may in writing notify persons
asserting an interest in property of the estate that at some stated time in
the future he proposes to sell or otherwise dispose of the property. Be-
cause ten days' notice is something of a standard in bankruptcy cases, it
is suggested that a ten day notice will be considered to be "appropriate
notice." Unless a party in interest files a pleading with the court ob-
jecting to the disposition of the property in question andasksfor a hear-
ing on the issue, the debtor may proceed, without court order, to go
forward with the proposed disposition of the property and will not be
119. Id. § 552(b). The 1972 version of Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code, as adopted
in most states, automatically applies the security interest to proceeds. U.C.C. § 9-306(2).
120. 11 U.S.C.A. § 363(c)(4) (West 1979).
121. Id. § 363(c)(2). In an involuntary case, § 363 apparently does not apply unless the court
orders it. See id. § 303(0. Thus, cash collateral can be used without notice to the secured creditor
in an involuntary case.
122. Id. § 363(c)(1).
123. Id. § 363(b).
124. Id. § 102(1).
125. Id.
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required to segregate the proceeds. 126
It is not at all clear what the debtor or trustee must do during the
first few days following the filing of the petition in order to be able to
use or dispose of cash collateral or of collateral the proceeds of which
become cash collateral. In these days of the all-devouring reach of the
security interest of Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code, the av-
erage business will be destroyed before the debtor will be able to get an
order of the court "after notice and a hearing" to authorize the use of
cash collateral or of collateral the proceeds of which become cash col-
lateral. An earlier version of section 363 proposed that the debtor or
the trustee, without an order of the court, could use or sell what was
then called "soft collateral" for not more than five days after notifica-
tion of other parties who had an interest in that collateral. 27 This au-
thorization, however, did not make its way into the final draft. It is
probable that the debtor or the trustee, as a matter of survival, will
continue business as usual, and will continue to use the cash realized
from encumbered inventory and accounts receivable until the secured
creditor moves to stop him.
B. Adequate Protection
The Code drafters probably intended that before the debtor may
use or dispose of any property in which another entity has an interest,
either in the ordinary course of business or otherwise, "adequate pro-
tection' 21 of that interest be furnished. The drafters of these provi-
sions optimistically thought that the nature and amount of that
protection would be negotiated by the debtor and the interest holders
and that the court would not have to become involved.' 2 9 It is unlikely
that it will work out that way in practice. Secured creditors nourish
perpetual feelings of insecurity, and agreements will not come easily
for the debtor. It is far more likely that the authorization contained in
section 363(c) for the debtor to use noncash collateral in the ordinary
course of business without an order of the court will place the burden
on the secured creditor to invoke the jurisdiction of the court to require
the debtor to provide adequate protection of his interest. It is the prob-
able intent of this provision that the debtor take the initiative and reach
126. Id.
127. H.R. 8200, 95th Cong., Ist Sess. § 363(c)(2) (1977), reprinted in COLLIER ON BANK-
RUPTCY, App. 3 (15th ed. 1980) & 12 BANKRUPTCY REFORM ACT: A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY 345
(A. Resnick & E. Wypski eds. 1979).
128. Adequate protection is illustrated but not defined in 11 U.S.C.A. § 361 (West 1979).
129. HousE REPORT, supra note 66, at 338.
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an agreement with his secured creditors before continuing his opera-
tions. In the midst of the confusion that follows the filing of a petition
few debtors are likely to pursue this course of action.
The debtor's right to use collateral may become an issue before the
court in another way: the debtor may file a pleading seeking an order
of the court authorizing his use of collateral, or seeking the use of some
encumbered property of the estate other than in the ordinary course of
business.
When the debtor's right to use collateral does become an issue
before the court, the court is not required to provide adequate protec-
tion. 30 The court is required, however, to prohibit the use of collateral,
or to condition its use, sale, or lease, "as is necessary to provide ade-
quate protection" of the interest in the property that belongs to another
entity.' 31 In any such hearing, the debtor, or the trustee, has the burden
of proof on the issue of adequate protection.' 3
2
When the use of cash collateral does become an issue before the
court, prompt action should be taken by the court, scheduled in accord-
ance with the debtor's needs.' 33 The hearing may be only preliminary
or it may be consolidated with a hearing brought on by the secured
creditor's request for modification of the stay to permit foreclosure on
the collateral. 34
What is adequate protection? The Code provides no ready an-
swer. It tells us only that when adequate protection is required, it may
be provided by periodic cash payments, 35 by additional or replace-
ment collateral, 136 or by such other relief as will result in the realization
by the secured creditor of the "indubitable equivalent" of his interest in
the collateral.' 37 Finally, the Code specifies that the granting of an ad-
ministrative priority claim does not give a secured creditor the "indubi-
table equivalent" of the security interest in the collateral. 38
According to the legislative history, the purpose of adequate pro-
tection is to require such relief as will result in "realization by the pro-
130. Id. at 338-39.
131. Id. at 345 (discussing 11 U.S.C.A. § 363(e) (West 1979)).
132. Id.
133. 11 U.S.C.A. § 363(c)(3) (West 1979).
134. Id.
135. Id. § 361(l). This provision is derived from In re Bermer Corp., 445 F.2d 367 (2d Cir.
1971).
136. 11 U.S.C.A. § 361(2) (West 1979).
137. Id. § 361(3).
138. Id.
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tected entity of the value of its interest in the property involved."'' 39
The Code does not make any significant new contribution to the con-
cept of adequate protection, but instead borrows the more effective de-
vices developed by the courts under the Bankruptcy Act. 40 The House
Committee Report's attempted restatement of those principles confuses
the issues, and in its discussion of the method and purpose of valuation
leaves the measure of "realization of value" in a state of total confu-
sion. 141
Whatever adequate protection may really mean, the confusion is
heightened by the House Report's valuation discussion, which is
couched in terms of "realization of value." The Code, on the other
hand, refers repeatedly to compensating the secured creditor to the ex-
tent that the debtor's use or sale of the property "results in a decrease in
value of [the secured creditor's] interest in" such property, 42 which is
not the same thing. This is followed by the further distraction that the
adequate protection must result in "the indubitable equivalent of such
entity's interest in such property."' 143 In any event, to be certain that it
does result in the "indubitable equivalent," the Code provides that to
the extent that the protection afforded may result in less than the full
equivalent of the secured creditor's interest, that creditor is afforded a
claim that shall have priority over every other priority claim, 144 thus
further reducing any hope of the unsecured creditors that they may
ultimately receive something from the estate.
139. HousE REPORT, supra note 66, at 340.
140. See Baumann & King, Bankruptcy Law, 1978 ANN. SURVEY AM. L. 363, 378.
141. [All of the suggested means of protecting the secured creditor's interest rely) on the
value of the protected entity's interest in the property involved, The section does not
specify how value is to be determined, nor does it specify when it is to be determined.
These matters are left to case-by-case interpretation and development. It is expected that
the courts will apply the concept in light of facts of each case and general equitable
principles. It is not intended that the courts will develop a hard and fast rule that will
apply in every case. The time and method of valuation is not specified precisely, in order
to avoid that result. There are an infinite number of variations possible in dealings be.
tween debtors and creditors, the law is continually developing, and new ideas are contin-
ually being implemented in this field. The flexibility is important to permit the courts to
adapt to varying circumstances and changing modes of financing.
Neither is it expected that the courts will construe the term value to mean, in every
case, forced sale liquidation value or full going concern value. There is wide latitude
between those two extremes. In any particular case, especially a reorganization case, the
determination of which entity should be entitled to the difference between the going
concern value and the liquidation value must be based on equitable considerations based
on the facts of the case. It will frequently be based on negotiation between the parties.
Only if they cannot agree will the court become involved.
HousE REPORT, supra note 66, at 339.
142. 11 U.S.C.A. § 361(1), (2) (West 1979) (emphasis added).
143. Id. § 361(3).
144. Id. § 507(b).
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C. Postpetition Effect of Security Interests
As a general rule, under the Code after-acquired property of the
estate is not subject to any lien resulting from any security agreement
entered into by the debtor before the commencement of the case.145
The legislative history makes clear that this provision is intended to
govern the effect of a prepetition security interest in postpetition prop-
erty and that it applies not only to Uniform Commercial Code security
interests 146 but to all security interests defined in the Code.' 47 If the
prepetition security agreement extends to property of the debtor ac-
quired before commencement of the case and to "proceeds, product,
offspring, rents, or profits" of such property, the terms of the security
agreement and "applicable nonbankruptcy law" will be enforced
against postpetition proceeds, rent, and the like, but the court may, af-
ter notice and a hearing and based on the equities of the case, order
otherwise. 148 The authority to adjust rights in proceeds, however, is
granted subject to the provisions of the Code regarding the use, sale, or
lease of property. 14  Accordingly, equitable adjustments cannot be
made without assurance that the secured party's interest in the proceeds
is adequately protected.
An earlier version of the provision affecting proceeds provided
that the prepetition security interest extended to such proceeds "except
to the extent that the estate acquired the proceeds to the prejudice of
other creditors holding unsecured claims."' 50 The exception was in-
tended to cover the situation in which the estate expends funds that
result in an increase in the value of the collateral. For example, if raw
materials were converted into inventory at some expense to the estate,
thus depleting the fund available to unsecured creditors, the prepetition
security interest was not permitted to improve the position of the se-
cured creditor as it existed at the filing of the petition in the case. The
compromise between the House bill and the Senate amendment re-
sulted in altering the earlier language to, a provision allowing the court,
after notice and a hearing, "and based on the equities of the case," to
145. Id. § 552(a).
146. See SENATE REPORT, supra note 103, at 91; HousE REPORT, supra note 66, at 313.
147. Id. § 101(37).
148. 11 U.S.C.A. § 552(b) (West 1979).
149. Id.
150. H.R. 8200, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. § 522(b) (1977), ieprintedin COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY,
App. 3 (15th ed. 1980) & 12 BANKRxjPTCY REFORM AcT of 1978: A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY (A.
Resnick & E. Wypyski eds. 1979).
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order otherwise. 5 It is doubtful that this results in any material
change in meaning. Thus, the court may still make such adjustment to
the valuation of the secured creditor's collateral that the adequate pro-
tection that is provided will not recognize any improvement in that
creditor's position as it existed at the commencement of the case.
D. Property of the Estate
Section 70(a) of the Bankruptcy Act'52 spoke in terms of "title" to
property. The Code drafters considered this to be unduly restrictive,
and the Code therefore speaks in terms of "property of the estate."' 153
The commencement of a bankruptcy case creates an estate, which is
comprised of all legal or equitable interests of the debtor, wherever lo-
cated, as of the commencement of the case. The scope of the provision
is intended to be broad and to include all kinds of property, tangible or
intangible, causes of action, and all other forms of property previously
specified in section 70(a) of the Bankruptcy Act. Once the estate is cre-
ated, no interests in property of the estate remain in the debtor. Only
property that is exempt under section 522 or is acquired after the com-
mencement of the case will belong to the debtor thereafter. Subject to
certain limitations, the estate also includes the interests of the debtor
and the debtor's spouse in community property. 154 Moreover, it in-
cludes property that the trustee recovers under the avoiding powers;
property that the debtor acquires by bequest, devise, inheritance, a
property settlement agreement with the debtor's spouse, or as the bene-
ficiary of a life insurance policy within 180 days after the filing of the
petition; and proceeds, product, offspring, rents, and profits of or from
property of the estate.155
E. Turnover of Property to the Estate
Anyone holding property of the estate on the date of the filing of
the petition, or property that the debtor or trustee may use, sell, or
lease, may be required under the Code to deliver it to the debtor or
trustee. 56 If the property is held by a custodian, the turnover proceed-
151. 11 U.S.C.A. § 552(b) (West 1979).
152. 11 U.S.C. § 110(a) (1976) (repealed 1978).
153. 11 U.S.C.A. § 541 (West 1979).
154. Id. § 541(a)(2).
155. Id. § 541(a). See also HousE REPORT, supra note 66, at 367-69.
156. 11 U.S.C.A. §§ 542, 543 (West 1979). It should be noted that "property that the trustee
may use, sell, or lease" is broader than "property of the estate." Id.
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ing is a contested matter.'57 If it is held by anyone other than a custo-
dian, the turnover is an adversary proceeding.'58 If a noncustodian in
possession of the property claims an interest in that property, he may
demand adequate protection of that interest as a condition precedent to
turnover. 59 This turnover proceeding arises in, and is directly related
to, the case pending in the bankruptcy court and may be brought only
in that court.' 60 The bona fides of the claim of the one in possession of
the property is no longer of any moment.
F Sale Free and Clear
The debtor or trustee may sell property free and clear of any inter-
est in the property of another entity, in the ordinary course of business
without notice or a hearing, 16 1 or other than in the ordinary course of
business after notice and a hearing.16 The sale may be free and clear
of the interests of other entities if applicable nonbankruptcy law per-
mits it, 13 if the other entity consents,"6 if the interest is a lien and the
sale price is greater than the amount secured by the lien,' 65 if the inter-
est is in bona fide dispute, 66 or if the other entity could be compelled to
accept money satisfaction of the interest in a legal or equitable proceed-
ing.' 67 At a sale free and clear of other interests, any holder of an inter-
est will be permitted to bid. If that holder is the high bidder, he will be
permitted to offset the value of his interest against the purchase price of
the property and be liable to the debtor or trustee only for the balance
of the sale price, if any.'6 '
G. Sale of Jointly-Owned Property
"Property which the [debtor or] trustee may use" is broader than
"property of the estate," and the chapter 11 debtor or trustee may re-
cover from others under section 542 property in which the debtor has
only an undivided ownership interest with another. The debtor is per-
157. Id. § 543; FED. BANKR. R. 914.
158. 11 U.S.C.A. § 542 (West 1979); FED. BANKR. R. 701(1).
159. 11 U.S.C.A. § 363(e) (West 1979).
160. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1471(b), (c) (West Cum. Supp. 1979).
161. 11 U.S.C.A. § 363(c)(1), (f) (West 1979).
162. Id. § 363(b).
163. Id. § 363(f)(1).
164. Id. § 363(f)(2).
165. Id. § 363(f)(3).
166. Id. § 363(f)(4).
167. Id. § 363(f)(5).
168. Id. § 363(k).
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mitted to sell a co-owner's interest in property in which the debtor has
an undivided ownership interest such as a joint tenancy, a tenancy in
common, a tenancy by the entirety, or a community property inter-
est,' 69 and to sell property that is subject to any vested or contingent
right in the nature of dower or curtesy. 70 The sale free and clear of
such other interest is permissible only if partition is impracticable,'
7 1 if
the sale of the estate's interest alone would realize significantly less for
the estate than sale of the property free of the interests of the co-own-
ers,' 7 2 and if the benefit to the estate of such a sale outweighs any detri-
ment to the co-owners. 7 3 The community interest of a nondebtor
spouse, or the interest of some other co-owner is protected by permit-
ting the co-owner to purchase the property being sold at the price at
which the sale is to be consummated. 7
4
H. Obtaining Credit
Without credit few debtors can survive in a reorganization pro-
ceeding. Under both Chapters X and XI of the Bankruptcy Act, the
debtor was not permitted to incur any further debt, either secured or
unsecured, without court approval. Under the Code, unless the court
orders otherwise, the debtor or trustee may obtain unsecured credit and
incur unsecured debt in the ordinary course of business without a court
order, and any debt so incurred automatically is entitled to a first prior-
ity as an administrative claim.' 75 Any unsecured debt incurred other
than in the ordinary course of business will be allowed a first priority
only if the court has authorized its incurrence after notice and a hear-
ing.' 76 However, in order to avoid a later argument with a trustee over
whether the credit was extended in the ordinary course of business, and
thus the risk of losing his priority, the careful supplier or lender who is
willing to extend unsecured credit to the debtor probably will insist on
court approval of the transaction.
If the debtor cannot obtain credit on a totally unsecured basis,
then with court approval credit may be obtained with priority over all
169. Id. § 363(h).
170. Id. § 363(g).
171. Id. § 363(h)(1).
172. Id. § 363(h)(2).
173. Id. § 363(h)(3).
174. Id. § 363(i).
175. Id. § 364(a).
176. Id. § 364(b).
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other administrative expenses,177 that is secured by a lien on property
of the estate that is not otherwise subject to a lien, 178 or that is secured
by a junior lien on property of the estate that is subject to a lien. 179 If
the debtor still is unable to obtain credit, the court, after notice and a
hearing, may authorize the obtaining of new credit which is secured by
an equal or senior lien on property of the estate, but only if adequate
protection is provided for the lienholder whose lien is to be equaled or
primed. 80 The debtor has the burden of proof on the issue of adequate
protection. 1'8
Z Executory Contracts and Unexpired Leases
Ipso facto or bankruptcy clauses in leases and other executory con-
tracts are invalidated by the Code. Thus, notwithstanding a provision
in an executory contract or unexpired lease, or in applicable non-
bankruptcy law, the contract or lease may not be terminated or modi-
fied because of the insolvency or financial condition of the debtor,
82
the filing of a case under Title 11,183 or the appointment of or taking
possession by a trustee in a case under Title 11 or a custodian before
the filing of a case under Title 11.84
Coupled with the invalidation of ipso facto clauses are provisions
permitting the assumption' 85 and subsequent reassignment' 86 of execu-
tory contracts and leases. If there has been a default in a contract or
lease, the debtor must cure the default, or provide adequate assurance
that he will promptly cure, before he may assume the contract or
lease. 87 In addition, the debtor must compensate, or provide adequate
assurance that he will promptly compensate, the other party to the con-
tract for any actual pecuniary loss resulting from the default, 88 and
provide adequate assurance of future performance under such contract
or lease.18 9 The requirement of cure does not apply to ipso facto
177. Id. § 364(c)(1).
178. Id. § 364(c)(2).
179. Id. § 364(c)(3).
180. Id. § 364(d)(1).
181. Id. § 364(d)(2).
182. Id. § 365(e)(1)(A).
183. Id. § 365(e)(1)(B).
184. Id. § 365(e)(1)(C).
185. Id. § 365(b).
186. Id. § 365(f).
187. Id. § 365(b)(1)(A).
188. Id. § 365(b)(1)(B).
189. Id. § 365(b)(1)(C).
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clauses, 90 and there are special limiting provisions applying to the as-
sumption and assignment of shopping center leases.' 9' If there has
been a default in a lease, the debtor may not require the lessor to pro-
vide services or supplies incidental to the lease unless the lessor is com-
pensated for any services and supplies provided under the lease before
the assumption. 92 A contract to make a loan, or to extend other debt
financing or financial accommodations, to the debtor or for the benefit
of the debtor may not be assumed or assigned.'
93
The debtor may assume or reject an executory contract or
unexpired lease at any time before confirmation of a plan, but the
court, on request of a party to the contract or lease, may order the
debtor to determine within a specified fime whether to assume or reject
it.' 94 The effective date of the rejection is stated in section 365(g). 195
There are limitations in the Code on claims of a lessor for damages
resulting from the termination of a lease or real property 196 or of an
employment contract.' 9
7
If the debtor as lessor seeks to reject his tenant's lease, the lessee
may treat the lease as terminated and assert a claim for damages
against the debtor, or he may remain in possession for the balance of
the term of the lease, including any renewal or extension of the term
that is enforceable under nonbankruptcy law. 9 If the lessee opts to
remain in possession, he may offset against the rent reserved under the
lease any damages occurring after the date of rejection caused by the
nonperformance of any obligation of the debtor-lessor after that date,
but he must forego any other claim against the estate on account of
damages arising from the rejection.' 99 This provision handily avoids
the enigma of the provision in section 70(b) of the Bankruptcy Act200
that rejection of an unexpired lease by the trustee of the lessor "does
not deprive the lessee of his estate," which the courts had never been
able to resolve.
190. Id. § 365(b)(2).
191. Id. § 365(b)(3).
192. Id § 365(b)(4).
193. 'Id. § 365(c)(2).
194. Id. § 365(d)(2). The other party to an executory contract is in an equivocal position be-
cause until the contract is rejected he is not a creditor with an allowable claim.
195. Id. § 365(g).
196. Id. § 502(b)(7).
197. Id. § 502(b)(8).
198. Id. § 365(h)(1).
199. Id. § 365(h)(2).




The debtor is given some, though possibly short-lived, protection
from a cut-off of service by a utility company because of the filing of a
case under Title 11. A utility company, be it the telephone, gas, or
electric company, may not alter, refuse, or discontinue service, or dis-
criminate against the debtor solely on the basis that a prepetition debt
was not paid.20 1 However, if within twenty days after filing the debtor
does not furnish adequate assurance of payment, in the form of a de-
posit or other security, for services after that date, the utility company
is free to act as it may see fit.202 On request of a party in interest, and
after notice and a hearing, the court may order reasonable modification
of the amount of the deposit or other security necessary to provide ade-
quate assurance of payment.20 3 This section is a codification of the
holding in In re Security Investment Properties, Inc. 204
The twenty-day period of the Code does not allow the debtor a
very generous length of time to negotiate the amount of the security
demanded by the utility company. Even if the debtor should file a mo-
tion with the court to intercede in the matter immediately upon the
filing of the chapter 11 petition, the court may not be able to schedule a
hearing on it within the twenty days provided by the Code. Although
the court in Securiy Investment Properties held that a bankruptcy court
under the 1898 Act could not enjoin disconnection of electric service
for refusal of the debtor to post security for future services, it would
appear that a bankruptcy court would have the authority under the
Code to enjoin temporarily a cut-off pending a hearing.
V. COMMITTEES OF CREDITORS AND STOCKHOLDERS
As soon as is practicable after the order for relief, the Code re-
quires that the court appoint a committee of unsecured creditors.20 5 In
pilot districts the appointment is made automatically by the United
States trustee.20 6 These provisions mean that in every case, large or
small, there must be at least one creditors' committee. The importance
of the committee cannot be overstated. The court's removal from ad-
ministrative involvement in the case places upon the committee, and
201. 11 U.S.C.A. § 366(a) (West 1979).
202. Id. § 366(b).
203. Id.
204. Georgia Power Co. v. Security Inv. Properties, Inc., 559 F.2d 1321, 1326 (5th Cir. 1977).
205. 11 U.S.C.A. § 1102(a) (West 1979).
206. Id. § 151102(a).
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upon the United States trustee in pilot districts, the burden of monitor-
ing the debtor's operations.
The appointment of a committee or committees is a departure
from the election of a single committee, which was the practice under
old Chapter XI. The announced purpose of the change is to preclude
self-seeking attorneys from controlling the election in order to have
themselves retained to represent the committee. °7 Moreover, appoint-
ment rather than election is intended to ensure that committees are
more fairly representative of the interests of the unsecured creditors.
A creditors' committee ordinarily shall consist of persons willing
to serve who hold the seven largest claims against the debtor of the
kinds represented on the committee.2 8 The court, or the United States
trustee, is permitted to recognize and appoint a committee organized by
creditors before the order for relief if that committee was fairly chosen
and is representative of the different kinds of claims to be repre-
sented.20 9 The court is not compelled to designate a committee consist-
ing of seven persons, nor is it compelled to select the members only
from the largest claims in any given case. A party in interest who does
not consider the appointed committee to be representative of the class
for which it was appointed may request the court to change the mem-
bership or the size of the committee to balance the representation of
particular classes.2"0
The functions of the committee are to determine whether the busi-
ness should continue in operation; to determine whether to move the
court to appoint a trustee or examiner; to conduct an investigation of
the financial affairs of the debtor; and to consult generally with the
debtor or trustee in the administration of the case.211 The most impor-
tant functions of the committee-participating in the formulation of a
plan and deciding whether to recommend it to the creditors- -- 212 usu-
ally will come at a later stage of the case.
Another change from old Chapter XI practice is the court's au-
thority to appoint, or to order the appointment of, additional commit-
tees of creditors or of equity security holders in order to ensure
adequate representation of affected groups. 13 In pilot districts, the ad-
207. HOUSE REPORT, supra note 66, at 93, 236.
208. 11 U.S.C.A. § 1102(b)(1) (West 1979).
209. Id.
210. Id. § 1102(c).
211. Id. § 1103(c).
212. Id. § 1103(c)(3).
213. Id. § 1102(a)(2).
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ditional committees ordered by the court are appointed by the United
States trustee.21 4
Although Chapter X of the Bankruptcy Act contained no provi-
sion recognizing "unofficial" committees of either creditors or stock-
holders, multiple committees representing divergent classes and
interests in those cases were not uncommon. Because these committees
were not "official," the services for which compensation might be al-
lowed were restricted.215 Chapter XI of the Act recognized only one
committee, which usually was referred to as the "official" committee.21 6
There is no prohibition against "unofficial" committees in chapter 11,
as under Chapter X of the Bankruptcy Act. However, an attorney or
other professional person employed by an "unofficial" committee may
be compensated out of the estate only for having made a substantial
contribution in the chapter 11 case.21 7 This is quite similar to the re-
strictions on compensation in Chapter X of the Bankruptcy Act. The
professional persons employed by committees appointed under section
1102 of the Code, however, are not subject to these restrictions; they
may be compensated from the estate based on time, the nature and
value of their services, and the cost of comparable services in nonban-
kruptcy matters.21 8 This compares favorably with the kinds of services
that are considered compensable under old Chapter XI. By providing
for compensation based on the "cost of comparable services other than
in a case under" Title 11,219 it was the intent to overrule In re Beverly
Crest Convalescent Hospital, Inc.22 and similar cases, in which courts,
with preachments of economy of administration and a thinly veiled re-
sentment of practicing attorneys' expectation of compensation at higher
hourly rates than federal district judges, slashed allowances to the at-
torneys involved in the cases to little more than subsistence level.221
214. Id. § 151102(b).
215. Bankruptcy Act §§ 242, 243, 11 U.S.C. §§ 642, 643 (1976) (repealed 1978).
216. Bankruptcy Act § 337, 11 U.S.C. § 737 (1976) (repealed 1978); FED. BANKR. R. 11-25.
217. 11 U.S.C.A. § 503(b)(3)(D) (West 1979).
218. Id. § 330(a)(1).
219. Id.
220. 548 F.2d 817 (9th Cir. 1976).
221. If [Beverly Crest] were allowed to stand, attorneys that could earn much higher in-
comes in other fields would leave the bankruptcy arena. Bankruptcy specialists, who
enable the system to operate smoothly, efficiently, and expeditiously, would be driven
elsewhere, and the bankruptcy field would be occupied by those who could not find other
work and those who practice bankruptcy law only occasionally almost as a public serv-
ice. Bankruptcy fees that are lower than fees in other areas of the legal profession may
operate properly when the attorneys appearing in bankruptcy cases do so intermittently,
because a low fee in a small segment of a practice can be absorbed by other work. Bank-
ruptcy specialists, however, if required to accept fees in all of their cases that are consist-
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There are restrictions on the employment of professional persons
by an appointed committee. These persons must be selected at a sched-
uled meeting of the committee at which a majority of the members are
present and may be employed only upon approval by the court. A per-
son employed to represent the committee may not represent any other
person or entity in the case.222 If that person has been representing a
creditor at the commencement of the case, he must give up that repre-
sentation if he is to serve the committee in the case.
VI. APPOINTMENT OF TRUSTEE OR EXAMINER
The Code presumes that the debtor will remain in possession and
continue to operate his business in a chapter 11 case. A trustee may be
appointed only on order of the court, made on request of a party in
interest, after notice and a hearing, and for cause shown.223 The
number of holders of the debtor's securities or the amount of assets or
liabilities of the debtor are specifically excluded from consideration by
the court as cause for the appointment of a trustee.224 Cause does in-
clude fraud, dishonesty, incompetence, or gross mismanagement of the
debtor's affairs by current management, either before or after com-
mencement of the case.225 The appointment of a tiustee also may be
made if it is in the interest of creditors, any security holders, or other
interests of the estate.226
These factors referred to in subsections 1104(a)(1) and 1104(a)(2)
of the Code are the very ones the SEC has advanced in its motions
under section 328 of the Bankruptcy Act and Rule 11-15 as the reasons
why a case should be transferred from Chapter XI to Chapter X, 227 and
they will probably be raised again in its motions for the appointment of
a trustee in the cases now being filed under chapter 11 of the Code.
There is cause to wonder whether the change effected by the Code has
done anything more than to give a new name to the same motion and
the same hearing.
If the court decides that a trustee should be appointed, the person
ently lower than fees they could receive elsewhere, will not remain in the bankruptcy
field.
HOUSE REPORT, supra note 66, at 330.
222. 11 U.S.C.A. § 1103(b) (West 1979).
223. Id. § 1104(a).
224. Id. § 1104(a)(1), (2).
225. Id. § 1104(a)(1).
226. Id. § 1104(a)(2).
227. See text accompanying notes 15-16 supra.
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selected does not have to be chosen from the panel of private trustees
established under Title 28, section 604(f) of the United States Code.228
In pilot districts, when the court decides that a trustee should be ap-
pointed, the appointment is made by the United States trustee; the per-
son selected does not have to be chosen from the panel of private
trustees established under Title 28, section 586(b), but is subject to ap-
proval by the court.229 The United States trustee also has standing to
request the appointment of a trustee or an examiner in these cases.23°
The protection afforded by a trustee would be needed in cases in
which current management of the debtor has been fraudulent, dishon-
est, or has grossly mismanaged the debtor's affairs. A trustee would
also be needed when the debtor's management has abandoned the busi-
ness.23' Generally, a trustee would not be needed in any case in which
the functions to be performed could be provided by an examiner. If
current management is adequate, but there is evidence of some miscon-
duct by former management, the necessary investigation can be con-
ducted by an examiner, presumably at a lesser cost to the estate than if
a trustee were to be appointed.
If the debtor's fixed, liquidated, unsecured debts, other than for
goods, services, or taxes, or owing to an insider,232 exceed five million
dollars the court must, on application of a party in interest, appoint an
examiner if it does not appoint a trustee.233 This appointment must be
made whether or not there is any evidence of fraud or mismanagement
by either current or past management. An examiner shall be appointed
also if the appointment is in the interests of creditors, any equity secur-
ity holders, or other interests of the estate.234
There appears to be a major oversight regarding the examiner.
The Code contains provisions detailing the employment of professional
persons by a trustee,2 3 5 and there are elaborate and detailed provisions
228. Compare 11 U.S.C.A. § 321 (West 1979).
229. Id. § 151104(c).
230. Id. § 151104(a), (b).
231. This is a situation that may occur with some frequency. It is unlikely that an individual
proprietor will stay in place very long after an order for relief is entered against him in an involun-
tary Chapter 11 case.
232. "Insider" is defined in 11 U.S.C.A. § 101(25) (West 1979).
233. Id. § 1104(b)(2). The examiner's duties are set out in § 1106(b) and include, in addition
to specific duties, "any other duties of the trustee that the court orders the debtor in possession not
to perform." Id. § 1106(b). Such "other duties" are not intended to include operation of the
business.
234. Id. §§ 1104(b)(1), 151104(b)(1).
235. Id. § 327.
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regarding the compensation of the persons so employed.236 Conspicu-
ously absent are any provisions for the employment of professional
persons by an examiner and any provisions regarding the compensa-
tion of these persons. There is no doubt that in conducting an investi-
gation the examiner must have the assistance of accountants, attorneys,
and possibly others. This matter seems to have escaped the attention of
the committees of both Houses in earlier competing drafts of the pro-
posed Bankruptcy Reform Act,237 as well as in the final draft, which
was passed amid the great confusion of last-minute amendments and
compromises in October 1978.
It is extremely doubtful that the court has inherent power to au-
thorize an examiner to employ professional persons and to allow them
compensation. The accepted tenets of statutory construction force the
conclusion that Congress, having provided for the employment and
compensation of professional assistants by trustees, debtors, and com-
mittees, but not by examiners, intended that an examiner should not
employ such persons and that no compensation should be permitted in
the event that any might be so employed. 238 It would seem that correc-
tive legislation is required if the provisions in the Code concerning the
appointment of an examiner are not to become totally meaningless.
VII. MEETINGS OF CREDITORS AND STOCKHOLDERS
The Code contemplates that within a reasonable time after the or-
der for relief in a case under chapter 11 there shall be a meeting of
creditors.239 In addition, in a case involving a corporation, the court
may order a meeting of equity security holders. 240 The Suggested In-
terim Bankruptcy Rules include a provision requiring at least twenty
days' notice of that meeting.24' The court may not preside at, and may
236. Id. §§ 328, 330, 331.
237. See H.R. 8200, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977), reprintedin COLLIER ON BANKRUPrcY, App.
3 (15th ed. 1980) & 12 BANKRUPrcY REFORM ACT OF 1978: A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY (A. Resnick
& E. Wypyski eds. 1979); S. 2266, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. (1978), reprinted in 17 BANKRUPTCY RE-
FORM ACT OF 1978: A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY (A. Resnick & E. Wypyski eds. 1979).
238. Cf. United Merchants and Mfrs., Inc. v. J. Henry Schroder Bank & Trust Co., 597 F.2d
348 (2d Cir. 1979) (compensation denied for services performed in a Chapter XI case because no
authority for compensation to attorneys and accountants employed by an indenture trustee could
be found in the Bankruptcy Act).
239. 11 U.S.C.A. § 341(a) (West 1979). SUGGESTED INTERIM RULE 2003(a) would have this
meeting and the meeting of equity security holders occur not less than 20 nor more than 40 days
after the order for relief.
240. 11 U.S.C.A. § 341(b) (West 1979).
241. SUGGESTED INTERIM Rule 2002(b).
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not attend, any such meeting.242 This, of course, creates a problem re-
garding the conduct of the meetings. The Suggested Interim Bank-
ruptcy Rules provide that the clerk of the bankruptcy court shall
preside at the meeting of creditors and equity security holders.243 The
debtor is required to appear and submit to examination under oath at
such meeting, and he may be examined by creditors, any indenture
trustee, or the trustee or examiner.244
VIII. FILING AND ALLOWANCE OF CLAIMS
The Bankruptcy Act concept of provability of claims245 is not car-
ried forward into the Code. In its place is the concept of allowabil-
ity.2 46 The purpose of the change is to make all claims allowable and to
avoid traps for the unwary, such as the provision in the Bankruptcy Act
that denied provability to a claim of damages for negligence unless a
suit had been instituted prior to the filing of the bankruptcy petition
and was still pending at the time of filing.247 The Code requires the
estimation of such claims, as well as contingent or unliquidated
claims,248 which often were denied allowability in a bankruptcy case
because liquidation or estimation of such claims would unduly delay
administration of the proceeding under the Bankruptcy Act.24 9
Whether the claim was denied provability or allowability, the result
was another nondischargeable debt for the bankrupt or debtor.
Section 1111 contains special rules for chapter 11 cases regarding
the proof of claims and interests that are not applicable in other
cases.250 If the claim or interest is scheduled by the debtor or trustee25'
as not disputed, not contingent, and not unliquidated, it is deemed filed
under section 501.252 In turn, a claim filed under section 501 is deemed
allowed unless a party in interest objects to it.2 53 Thus, creditors and
interest holders who are scheduled in this manner by the debtor or
trustee do not have to file claims in the case in order to vote and to
242. 11 U.S.C.A. § 341(c) (West 1979).
243. See SUGGESTED INTERIM RULE 2003(b)(1), (2).
244. 11 U.S.C.A. § 343 (West 1979).
245. Bankruptcy Act § 63, 11 U.S.C. § 103 (1976) (repealed 1978).
246. 11 U.S.C.A. §§ 501-502 (West 1979).
247. Bankruptcy Act § 63a(7), 11 U.S.C. § 103(a)(7) (1976) (repealed 1978).
248. 11 U.S.C.A. § 502(c) (West 1979).
249. Bankruptcy Act § 57(d), 11 U.S.C. § 93(d) (1976) (repealed 1978).
250. 11 U.S.C.A. § I111 (West 1979).
251. Id. §§521(1), 1106(a)(2).
252. Id. § 1111(a).
253. Id. § 502(a).
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participate in any distribution under any plan that may be confirmed in
the case. If the claim or interest is scheduled by the debtor or trustee as
disputed, contingent, or unliquidated, however, the holder of that claim
or interest is required to file a proof of claim or interest if he is to
participate in the case by either voting or sharing in distribution. 54
The holder of the claim or interest is required to determine for himself
how his claim or interest is scheduled. These Code provisions are par-
allel to the existing Chapter X Rules25" rather than the Chapter XI
Rules25 6 and the chapter 11 debtor has no possibility of gaining dis-
charge of claims the holders of which fail to file proofs in the case.
As was the case under the Bankruptcy Act and Rules, a proof of
claim or interest as filed constitutes prima facie evidence of the validity
and amount of the claim or interest.25 7 The Code does not specify the
time within which the required proofs must be filed. Accordingly, until
new rules are promulgated, a bar order fixing such time must be en-
tered by the court, as under old Chapter X.258
IX. THE PLAN
In the debate over consolidation of the business reorganization
chapters, the argument was made that Chapter XI, in permitting a plan
to be filed only by the debtor, allowed the debtor too much power. One
writer has referred to it as "the almost arrogant power of the Chapter
XI debtor to force liquidation if creditors do not agree to his business
rescue plan. '2 59 This view does not recognize the power over the plan
wielded by a strong creditors' committee, and, as was noted earlier, the
committees appointed under the Code provisions almost certainly will
exercise a great deal more power and control than was ever possible for
a committee under old Chapter XI. In the process of negotiating a plan
in a case under old Chapter XI, the debtor was always fully aware that
the demands of the creditors' committee would have to be met or an
adjudication could follow. For management of a corporate debtor, the
prospect of adjudication might not have been all that important. If the
creditors thought they could get more if the business were kept alive,
however, there was nothing to prevent their moving for a conversion to
254. Id. § 1111(a).
255. FED. BANKR. R. 10-401.
256. FED. BANKR. R. 11-33.
257. 11 U.S.C.A. § 502(a) (West 1979).
258. FED. BANKR. R. 10-401(b)(1).
259. See Trost, supra note 2, at 1310,
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Chapter X under old Rule 11-15. Failing that, they could file an invol-
untary Chapter X petition in the pending Chapter XI case, letting a
trustee displace old management and try to resurrect a viable business
from the ruins. On the other hand, if the debtor was an individual and
he preferred liquidation to a too stern plan insisted on by the commit-
tee, nothing could prevent his choosing liquidation. He could ask for
adjudication at any time and walk away with his exempt property.
The situation under the Code has not really changed all that
much. In a voluntary chapter 11 case, as long as the debtor remains in
possession, be it a corporate or an individual debtor, the debtor still has
the option at any time to convert to a case under chapter 7, the Bank-
ruptcy Code equivalent of adjudication and liquidation under the
Act;260 his conversion filed in the chapter 11 case constitutes an order
for relief under chapter 7,261 whether the creditors like it or not. True,
if the creditors wish, they may seek to re-convert to chapter 11.262 But
if the individual debtor chooses, as he probably will, they will have to
get along without him, and his exempt property is beyond the reach of
any plan the creditors later may file in the case.263
A. Who May File a Plan
Whether the case originated with a voluntary or involuntary peti-
tion, if the debtor has remained in possession, he has the exclusive right
to file a plan for 120 days after the date of the order for relief.264 If the
debtor does file a plan within this period, he has an additional 60 days
in which to obtain the necessary acceptances.265 If the necessary ac-
ceptances are obtained within 180 days, the statute apparently contin-
ues the exclusive period while the debtor seeks confirmation.266 On
motion of any party in interest and for cause shown, the court may
reduce or extend the 120-day period or the 180-day period.2 67
When a trustee is appointed, the debtor loses the exclusive right to
260. 11 U.S.C.A. § 1112 (West 1979).
261. Id. § 348(a).
262. Id. § 706(b).
263. Id. § 1123(c).
264. Id. § 1121(b). Moreover, the appointment of an examiner does not affect this right of the
debtor.
265. Id. § 1121(c)(3).
266. HousE REPORT, supra note 66, discussing the effect of § 1121(c)(3) states: "If a trustee
has been appointed, if the debtor does not meet the 120-day deadline, or if the debtor does meet
that deadline butfails to obtain the required consents within 180 days after the filing of the petition,
then any party in interest may propose a plan." Id. at 406. (emphasis added)
267. 11 U.S.C.A. § 1121(d) (West 1979).
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file a plan; any party in interest may file a plan at any time after the
appointment.268 In this context the debtor is a party in interest269 and is
entitled to file a plan if he chooses.
B. Classofcation of Claims or Interests
Basic to the formulation of any plan is the classification of claims
and interests. The plan may classify claims or interests as long as each
class is composed of substantially similar claims or interests.270 How-
ever, small unsecured claims, whether or not substantially similar, may
be designated as a separate class, subject to court approval, as an ad-
ministrative convenience.27' Under Chapter XI of the Bankruptcy Act
and the Rules, the need for this treatment was greater because a filed
but nonvoting claim was counted as a negative vote, whereas plan pro-
visions for payment of those claims in full meant that they were not
"materially and adversely affected," rendering it unnecessary for the
class to vote at all. There is less need for such a provision under the
Code because the majorities required for acceptance of a plan are
based only on those that actually vote;272 a nonvote does not count as a
rejection, even if the creditor has fied a proof of claim in the case.
C Contents of a Plan
The mandatory2 73 and permissive274 provisions of a plan under
chapter 11 of the Code are lifted almost verbatim from Chapter X of
the Bankruptcy Act.275 It is therefore not surprising that some of these
provisions fit a corporation far better than they do the individual
debtor.276 One mandatory provision of a plan that merits special atten-
tion is found in the confirmation section of the Code rather than in
section 1123 where one might expect it: a plan is required to accommo-
date priority claims.2 77 Administrative expenses 271 and claims arising
in the ordinary course of business after commencement of an involun-
268. Id. § 1121(c)(1).
269. Id.
270. Id. § 1122(a).
271. Id. § 1122(b).
272. Id. § 1126(c).
273. Id. § 1123(a).
274. Id. § 1123(b).
275. Bankruptcy Act § 216, 11 U.S.C. § 616 (1976) (repealed 1978).
276. E.g., 11 U.S.C.A. § I123(a)(5)(I), (5)(J), (6), (7) (West 1979).
277. Id. § 1129(a)(9).
278. Id. § 507(a)(1).
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tary case and before the appointment of a trustee or entry of the order
for relief' 79 must be provided for in cash.280 Priority wage claims,281
contributions to employee benefit plans,282 and consumer deposits283
may be classified and provided for on a deferred basis, but payment in
cash will be required for any such class that fails to accept the plan.28 4
Priority tax claims, 285 on the other hand, may be paid over a period of
time not exceeding six years after the date of assessment of the tax,
286
and consent to such treatment by the taxing authority is not required.
These changes in prior law to permit deferred payment are designed to
reduce the cash requirements for confirmation.
Some old case law is overruled,287 and a plan may provide for
liquidation of the property of the debtor, in whole or in part, and distri-
bution of the proceeds of the sale among holders of claims and inter-
ests.288
D. Disclosure Statement
In cases under chapter 11, large and small alike, before there may
be any post-petition solicitation of acceptances of a plan, the proponent
must submit to the court, and obtain court approval of, a disclosure
statement.289 This requirement is new; nothing comparable to it ap-
peared in the Bankruptcy Act.290 The disclosure statement require-
ment may be the most significant aspect of new chapter 11. Indeed, it
has been labeled as the pivotal concept of a reorganization case and the
"key" to the consolidated chapter.29' As the House report states:
The premise underlying the consolidated chapter 11 of this bill
is the same as the premise of the securities laws. If adequate disclo-
sure is provided to all creditors and stockholders whose rights are to
279. Id. § 507(a)(2).
280. Id. § 1129(a)(9)(A).
281. Id. § 507(a)(3).
282. Id. § 507(a)(4).
283. Id. § 507(a)(5).
284. Id. § l129(a)(9)(B).
285. Id. § 507(a)(6).
286. Id. § 1129(a)(9)(C).
287. See, e.g., In re Pure Penn Petroleum Co., 188 F.2d 851 (2d Cir. 1951) (not permitting a
liquidating plan); In re Northern Ill. Dev. Corp. 324 F.2d 104 (7th Cir. 1963), cert. denied 376 U.S.
938 (1964).
288. 11 U.S.C.A. § 1123(b)(4) (West 1979).
289. Id. § 1125(b).
290. Bankruptcy Act § 174, 11 U.S.C. § 574 (1976) (repealed 1978) and FED. BANKR. R. 10-
303 required court approval of a plan as a predicate to postpetition solicitation of acceptances.
291. HoUSE REPORT, supra note 66, at 236.
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be affected, then they should be able to make an informed judgment
of their own, rather than having the court or the Securities and Ex-
change Commission inform them in advance whether the proposed
plan is a good plan. Therefore, the key to the consolidated chapter is
the disclosure section.292
A disclosure statement may be approved by the court only if it
contains "adequate information," which is defined to mean "informa-
tion of a kind, and in sufficient detail, as far as is reasonably practicable
in light of the nature and history of the debtor and the condition of the
debtor's books and records, that would enable a hypothetical reason-
able investor typical of holders of claims or interests of the relevant
class to make an informed judgment about the plan. '293 A typical in-
vestor would be one having a claim or interest of the relevant class and
the same ability to obtain information from sources other than the dis-
closure statement as other holders of the same class generally have.294
Despite a specific provision in the Code that the adequacy of the
disclosure statement is not to be governed by any otherwise applicable
nonbankruptcy law, rule, or regulation,295 there are indications that the
SEC, which has the right to raise an issue in a chapter 11 case and to
appear and be heard on it,296 will attempt to convince the bankruptcy
courts that these disclosure statements must comply with its own regu-
lations. While no doubt there will arise some overlap between SEC
definitions of "adequate disclosure" and those developed by bank-
ruptcy courts, Congress clearly has made securities laws inapplicable in
a reorganization case.297 Congress also has pared down the authority
of the SEC to press this issue beyond the bankruptcy court. The SEC
and state blue sky agencies may not appeal from an order approving
the disclosure statement.298 The Code contains a "safe harbor" provi-
sion that immunizes any person who, in good faith and in compliance
with the provisions of chapter 11, solicits or participates in the offer,
issuance, sale, or purchase of a security under a plan from any liability,
on account of such solicitation or participation, for violation of any
federal or state law, rule, or regulation governing the offer, issuance,
sale, or purchase of securities.299 It provides protection from legal ia-
292. Id.
293. 11 U.S.C.A. § 1125(a)(1) (West 1979).
294. Id. § 1125(a)(2).
295. Id. § 1125(d).
296. Id. § 1109(a).
297. Id. § 1125(d).
298. Id.
299. Id. § 1125(e).
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bility as well as from injunctive action by the SEC or other agency or
official.3 °
The same disclosure statement must be transmitted to each holder
of a claim or interest of a particular class, but different disclosure state-
ments, differing in amount, detail, or kind of information, may be
transmitted to different classes. This provision is intended to permit
flexibility in the preparation and distribution of the required disclo-
sure.31 ' The disclosure statement must be approved prior to submis-
sion of the plan for a vote and must accompany the plan or a summary
upon the plan's transmittal.30 2
In the event the debtor seeks confirmation of a prepetition plan
based in whole or in part upon prepetition acceptances, the issue of
disclosure is treated differently. Prepetition acceptances may be
counted only if the solicitation was in compliance with any applicable
nonbankruptcy-that is, securities-laws. 3  If the prepetition solicita-
tion was of a type not governed by any nonbankruptcy law, then these
acceptances will be counted only if the court finds that there was in fact
adequate disclosure.? 4 Prepetition solicitation is not covered by the
"safe harbor" provision of section 1125(e).3 05
The hearing on approval of the disclosure statement is one of the
major procedural hearings in a reorganization case." 6 Although this
hearing essentially replaces the old Chapter X hearing on approval of
the plan, the Code does not require a valuation of the business as a
predicate to court approval of the disclosure statement unless adequate
information cannot be provided without such a valuation. If no securi-
ties307 are to be issued under the plan, a valuation hearing in all
probability will not be necessary. 8
Experience has proved that even a relatively simple disclosure
statement can be a very expensive exercise. Should a certified audit of
the debtor's books and records be required as a predicate for the state-
ment, the combined cost will be frightful. If in addition there must be a
valuation of the business, it is clear that the total cost will be of such
300. HOUSE REPORT, supra note 66, at 408; SENATE REPORT, supra note 103, at 122.
301. HOUSE REPORT, supra note 66, at 227.
302. 11 U.S.C.A. § 1125(b) (West 1979).
303. I1d. § 1126(b)(2).
304. Id.
305. Id.
306. HOUSE REPORT, supra note 66, at 227.
307. See 11 U.S.C.A. § 101(35) (definition of "security").
308. House REPORT, supra note 66, at 227.
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magnitude that only a major business will be able to survive the pro-
cess.
E. Acceptance of the Plan
The percentage of votes required by the Code for acceptance of a
plan differs from all three rehabilitation chapters of the Bankruptcy
Act, as does the method of computing the vote.
Under the Code, a class of creditors has accepted a plan when
creditors holding a majority in number and two-thirds in amount of
claims in the class vote to accept it.3°9 A class of equity security holders
has accepted the plan when two-thirds in amount of interests in the
class vote to accept it.310 In both instances, the vote is computed on the
basis only of creditors and interest holders who actually vote. The neg-
ative vote imputed to a creditor or interest holder who had filed a proof
of claim or interest but did not vote on the plan3' is gone. 2
There are two classes or types of creditors and interest holders
whose vote is not required. First, a class that is not impaired under the
plan is deemed to have accepted the plan.31 3 Therefore, the solicitation
of acceptances from holders of claims or interests in such a class is not
required. Second, a class that is to receive nothing under the plan is
deemed to have rejected the plan.31 4 In this second situation, if any
class is excluded, before the court may confirm such a plan, it must find
that the plan is fair and equitable as to such class and to any class
below it.31 5 In other words, the presence of such a rejecting class will
require a valuation of the debtor and a determination that the reorgani-
zation values do not reach this class or any below it before confirma-
tion is possible.
F Impairment of Claims or Interests
The Bankruptcy Act concept of "materially and adversely af-
fected" classes316 has been replaced by the concept of "impairment" of
309. 11 U.S.C.A. § 1126(c) (West 1979).
310. Id. § 1126(d).
311. Bankruptcy Act § 362(1), 11 U.S.C. § 762(1) (1976) (repealed 1978); FED. BANKR. R. 10-
305(e), 12-37(d).
312. 11 U.S.C.A. § 1126(c), (d) (West 1979).
313. Id. § 1126(f).
314. Id. § 1126(g).
315. Id. § 1129(b).
316. Bankruptcy Act § 308, 11 U.S.C. § 708 (1976) (repealed 1978).
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claims or interests.317 A class of claims or interests is impaired under a
plan unless the plan "leaves unaltered the legal, equitable, and contrac-
tual rights" of the class, 318 cures any default that occurred before com-
mencement of the case,3 19 or pays the holders in cash.32 ° If by these
standards a class is impaired, its acceptance of the plan is required for
confirmation;321 if an impaired class does not accept, the cram down
must be invoked, and the plan must be "fair and equitable" to that
class and any below it.3
22
As has been mentioned, a curing of default avoids impairment of a
claim. This authority to cure a prepetition default without requiring
the consent of that creditor or class of creditors 23 is new. Since the
creditor or class is deemed to be unimpaired, acceptance is not needed.
If the claim was based on an installment-type loan that, because of the
debtor's default, had been accelerated before the commencement of the
Chapter 11 case, the debtor may reverse the acceleration and reinstate
the loan by providing in the plan for payment of the missed install-
ments, for compensation to the holder of the claim for any damages
incurred as a result of reasonable reliance by the holder on the contrac-
tual provision, and for reinstatement of the maturity of the claim as it
existed before the default.324 If the prepetition default was the result of
an ipso facto or bankruptcy clause, no cure is required.325 The matur-
ity as provided in the original note or other obligation must be rein-
stated exactly as written. If the debtor should seek to extend the
maturity date, the creditor's acceptance will be required.
X. CONFIRMATION OF THE PLAN
The first six requirements for confirmation of a plan326 are copied
from Chapter X of the Bankruptcy Act.327 There are no surprises here.
The vital requirements for confirmation are found in subparagraphs (7)
and (8) of section 1129(a) of the Code.328 It has been reported that the
317. 11 U.S.C.A. § 1124 (West 1978).
318. Id. § 1124(1).
319. Id. § 1124(2).
320. Id. § 1124(3).
321. Id. § 1129(a)(8).
322. Id. § 1129(b).
323. Id. § 1124(2).
324. Id.
325. Id. § 365(b)(2).
326. Id. § 1129(a)(1)-(6).
327. Bankruptcy Act § 221, 11 U.S.C. § 621 (1976) (repealed 1978).
328. 11 U.S.C.A. § 1129(a) (West 1979).
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design of the Code drafters was to adopt the interest of creditors test of
Chapter XI of the Bankruptcy Act and to avoid the fair and equitable
test of Chapter X whenever a chapter 11 plan has been accepted by all
impaired classes of claims and interests.329 The question is whether
they have achieved that noble purpose.
Even though each impaired class has accepted the plan by the req-
uisite majorities, 330 the court still must find, with respect to each class,
that each holder of a claim or interest within that class who voted
against the plan will receive or retain under the plan property of a
value that is not less than the amount that he would receive or retain if
the debtor were liquidated under chapter 7 on the effective date of the
plan.331 If even one holder of a claim or interest who voted against the
plan will receive or retain less, the plan cannot be confirmed. This re-
quirement can produce a result not anticipated by the reformers and
the drafters. It can produce a situation in which all necessary classes of
claims and interests have accepted the plan by overwhelming majori-
ties and the plan still cannot be confirmed because one dissonant credi-
tor may receive more if the debtor is liquidated under chapter 7.
Determination of the hypothetical distribution in a liquidation
under chapter 7 is no simple matter. The court will have to consider
the various subordination provisions that apply in chapter 7332 as well
as the tax-claim postponement provisions.333 The rules regarding part-
nership distributions 334 and distributions of community property335
must be fully accommodated as well.
It is apparent that the financial standards of confirmation have
been made exceedingly complex by the provisions of the Code. They
are difficult to comprehend; their application is well-nigh impossible.
Should the court, in that attempted application, go wrong regarding a
single creditor or interest holder, reversal of the order of confirmation
may well result. Inevitably, then, appeals from confirmation orders
may be expected to increase, as will reversals on appeal. During the
delay caused by such appeals, the debtor will be in limbo, and, regard-
less of the outcome, as a result may simply expire.
What happens when all classes of creditors and interests do not
329. SENATE REPORT, .rupra note 103, at 126.
330. Id. § 1129(a)(8).
331. Id. § 1129(a)(7).
332. Id. §§ 510, 726(a)(3)-(4).
333. Id. § 724.
334. Id. § 723.
335. Id. § 726(c).
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accept a plan? Impaired classes that do not accept a plan are protected
by the fair and equitable rule.336 The Code attempts to describe the
meaning of "fair and equitable" for the purposes of chapter 11.337 Sec-
tion 1129(b)(2) is divided into three subsections, dealing with when a
plan is fair and equitable insofar as secured creditors,338 unsecured
creditors,339 and ownership interests34° are concerned. When the cram
down must be invoked, the plan may be confirmed only if the nonac-
cepting class or classes are dealt with in a manner that meets the appro-
priate standards announced in the statute. The entire concept is mind-
boggling. Even one of the drafters of these provisions has described an
understanding of the cram down as requiring "a torturous journey
through the statute and legislative history that is fraught with complex
concepts, terms of art, and innuendoes. '341 Discussion of those provi-
sions is deferred to those persons who purport to understand them.342
XI. THE DISCHARGE
The discharge that results from confirmation of a plan of a corpo-
ration or a partnership is a discharge of all obligations of the debtor to
creditors, regardless of whether those creditors are dealt with under the
plan or participate in the reorganization. 43 These are entities that are
not entitled to a discharge in a chapter 7 case.344 However, the individ-
ual debtor, who is entitled to a discharge in chapter 7,345 gets no better
discharge than he would receive in chapter 7; he still must face debts
excepted from discharge under section 523 of the Code.B46 No explana-
tion is attempted in the legislative history of this provision, which re-
sults in such rank discrimination against the well-intentioned
individual debtor.
336. Id. § 1129(b)(1).
337. Id. § 1129(b)(2).
338. Id. § 1129(b)(2)(A).
339. Id. § 1129(b)(2)(B).
340. Id. § 1129(b)(2)(C).
341. Klee,411 You Ever Wanted To Know.4bout Cram Down Under the New Bankruptcy Code,
53 AM. BANKR. L.J. 133, 136 (1979).
342. Klee, supra note 341; Pachulski, Cram Down and Valuation Under Chapter 11 ofthe Bank-
ruptcy Code, this symposium.
343. 11 U.S.C.A. § 1141 (West 1979).
344. Id. § 727(a)(1).
345. Id.
346. Id. § 1141(d)(2).
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XII. CONCLUSION
The reformers' attempt to cure flaws that they saw in the two-track
system of Chapters X and XI of the Bankruptcy Act, some of which
may have been real, many of which to these writers seem imaginary,
has resulted in a clear case of overkill. The consolidated chapter has
not been made more expeditious. New chapter 11 promises a reorgani-
zation procedure as time consuming and as expensive as old Chapter
X. Early litigation over adequate protection and the appointment of a
trustee will lengthen the time and increase the costs associated with the
debtor's efforts at reorganization. If the debtor is fortunate enough to
make it over this first hurdle, it is then faced with correcting the opera-
tional deficiencies that brought it into the court, then with preparing a
plan, and then with preparing a disclosure statement that will ade-
quately inform its creditors and investors of its chances of rehabilita-
tion, an exercise that will sap even further the debtor's time, energy,
and money.
With the consolidated chapter's failure to maintain the expeditious
contours of old Chapter XI, we cannot believe that the new procedure
can be "more equitable." If the reformers' definition of that phrase
means more leverage and control for the secured creditors, the Code
has achieved it. However, a more fundamental question remains un-
answered: is the procedure truly more equitable if it diminishes the
debtor's chances of rehabilitation to the point that it also undermines
the very purposes behind these controls? The fates of unsecured credi-
tors and equity security holders ride in tandem with the fate of the
debtor. Equity for these participants depends on continuation of the
debtor's business, not on the whim of the auction block or the secured
creditor's foreclosure sale.
We predict that the additional strictures and the more burdensome
procedures of new chapter 11 will account for increasing failures in the
reorganization court. The reformers have needlessly realigned the
competing interests in a reorganization case at the expense of small and
middle-sized debtors, who in all probability will not survive the pro-
cess.
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